a discussion of the Licensing Act in a January 2, 1693 letter to Clarke (hereinafter "January 2 Letter") that is consistent in its tenor and arguments. 5 Clarke apparently shared the memorandum with other members of Parliament 6 and Locke is credited by at least one scholar as being "directly responsible for . . . the expiry of the licensing of the press." 7 In the face of continued efforts to renew the Licensing Act, in March 1695 Clarke introduced in Parliament a much less onerous counter-proposal for regulating the press. Locke was sent the proposal on March 14, 1695 and quickly responded with his own suggestions for amendments; Locke's suggestions further instruct us -as discussed below --on Locke's views of authorial rights.
Although the memorandum begins with censorship issues [at 375-377] and occasionally returns to them [e.g. at 384], Locke focuses a great deal of his prose on the economics of the issue: the high cost of classic works and the shoddy quality of printing in England compared to printing in Holland because of the exclusive rights held by the Company of Stationers. Locke describes them as being the "lazy, ignorant Company of Stationers, to say no worse of them" [at 381], a description repeated in his January 2 Letter to Clarke.
Locke commentators predominantly understand the memorandum in the context of censorship, 8 but it is its focus on the monopoly held by the Stationers -as well as Locke's near silence on authorial rights --which has brought the memorandum into discussions in intellectual property circles. 9 The different ways scholars approach the memorandum does point to an important interpretative question: how much was Locke in parliamentary arguments to defeat renewal of the Licensing Act). In his introductory remarks, King describes the memorandum as Locke's reaction against censorship; in the 1884 volume, the memorandum carries a header "HIS OBSERVATIONS ON THE CENSORSHIP" [sic] . (I do not know whether this header was King's editorial choice.) Fox Bourne's 19 th century biography of Locke similarly describes the memorandum as presenting "arguments for liberty of the press." Bourne, supra note 2 at 315. Professor Goldie entitles the memorandum and related documents under "Liberty of the Press," but recognizes that "[l]iberty of the press was not the only, perhaps not even the main, rallying cry of opponents of the Act, but rather the lucrative monopoly powers of the Stationer's Company." Goldie., supra note 1 at 329. making an economic argument (against the Stationers) only to achieve more obliquely a political end (the end of censorship)?
No express connection between Locke's property theory and rights in books
Neither the memorandum nor, apparently, any other now published writing of Locke makes any express connection between rights (or their absence) in expressive works and Locke's property theory.
10 On the other hand, there are at least two good reasons not to infer too much from this silence. First, as Seana Shiffrin points out, we should not "make too much of the[se] brief, political remarks" 11 -and they indeed seem to have very politically-oriented remarks.
12 Second, the memorandum does hint that Locke would not have been opposed to the application of his labor theory of property to expressive works --with one exception.
Locke's opposition to perpetual rights in books
The exception is that Locke was quite consciously opposed to the idea of perpetual exclusive rights in expressive works. 13 Halfway through the memorandum, he objects to exclusive rights "in any book which has been in print fifty years." [at 379 -380] 14 He
10
There are also at least a couple places in the Two Treatises (Locke scholars may identify others) where Locke deals with a subject where one thinks he might have seen a connection --but does not --between his theory of ownership and the generation of new ideas and expression. For example in Section 44 of the Second Treatise, he writes:
From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others. TWO TREATISES, supra note 7 at 340-341. The ambiguity in this passage is that that which a person creates through labor after "invention and arts ha [ve] improved the conveniences of life" belongs to the person as property, but there is no thought on who might own the "invention and arts." As one Locke scholar has commented, in this passage it seems that "[t]he 'Inventions and Arts,' however, are not perfectly his own and do belong in common with others." RUTH W. GRANT, JOHN LOCKE 'S LIBERALISM 113 (1987) . In Section 101 of the Two Treatises Locke also talks about the rise of "records, and letters" coming in civil society after "other more necessary arts" which provide for people's "safety, esae, and plenty" without commenting about rights in these "necessary arts" or "letters." See TWO TREATISES, supra note 7 at 378.
11
Shiffrin, supra note 9 at 155.
12
Astbury believes that although Locke was familiar with Milton's argument for press freedom in Aeropagitica, "Locke's Memorandum owed more directly to the pamphleteers of the 1692/3 [parliamentary] session than to Milton," Astbury, supra note 4 at 307, suggesting, likewise, that the memorandum was written in a more pragmatic frame of mind. As one of the reader of this introduction noted, the memorandum is "an interesting piece of lobbying" but "is not that deeply theorized." 13 2 January Letter, supra note 5 at 367. Discussing the Stationers' Company's exclusive printing rights, Locke wrote "[f]or it is a great oppresion upon scholars, and what right can anyone pretend to have to the writings of one who lived a thousand years ago." In that passage, we see Locke conscious of the idea of perpetual protection and making absolutely no connection to his own theory of property. 14 In this passage, Locke poses the question "I demand whether, if another act for printing should be made, it be reasonable that nobody have any peculiar right in any book which has been in printed fifty years, but any one as well as another might have the liberty to print it." similarly closes the memorandum telling us that perpetual exclusive rights in the works of ancient authors is absurb:
This I am sure, it is very absurd and ridiculous that any now living should pretend to have a propriety in, or a power to dispose of, the propriety of any copy or writings of authors who lived before printing was known or used in Europe. [at 387] Professor Mark Rose and I have written separately to describe reasons why the use of "propriety" and "property" seem to have been alloyed during this time. 15 Locke's use of "propriety" here comports with that premise and James Tully has also traced how Locke use of "propriety" is connected to Aquinas' use of proprietas for any form of individual and exclusive possession. 16 But this is a point on which Locke scholars should guide us.
Locke expressly proposes a property right in language that suggests pre-existing rights
In contrast to his opposition to perpetual exclusive control, Locke supported limited property rights covering books and hints flirtatiously that these might be preexisting rights. At almost the end of the memorandum Locke writes that he is not opposed to publishers being able to purchase exclusive publishing rights from authors. He proposes that when a publisher purchases rights "from authors that now live and write, it may be reasonable to limit their property to a certain number of years after the death of the author, or the first printing of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy years." [at 387] Professor Shiffrin may have overlooked this passage in her own analysis of the memorandum because [a] she believed that Locke's "proposal specifies a term of years, not a life term" and [b] she writes that Locke's proposal was for a term of protection that would be "significantly shorter" than "current legal protection."
17
Of course, for the intellectual property community the remarkable thing about Locke's words here --good or bad --is just the opposite: that Locke proposed a life term as one possibility and that, at its extreme, he proposed a life term that equals current legal protection. It would be 15 Rose, supra note 9 at 32 and 81; Hughes, supra note * at 1011-1012.
16
JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 65 (1980) . For full disclosure, I should point to a passage of the Two Treatises in which the philosopher uses "property" and "propriety" in sufficient proximity to suggest slightly different meanings, but Locke's use in this section seems consistent with the formula Tully uses to describe Grotius' views: "Property (dominium) is identified with exclusive possession (proprietas)." Id. at 70. Writing just a few years before Locke, Pufendorf also equated property and proprietas. Id. at 72. Richard Ashcraft also seems to interpret Locke as using "property" and "propriety" interchangeably. See Richard Ashcraft, Locke's political philosophy in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LOCKE, 226, 237 (Vere Chappell, ed. 1994 ).
17
Shiffrin writes in a footnote: "Locke's proposal --a term of years followed by a lapse into the public domain --does not differ in kind from current legal protections, although it is significantly shorter. I question whether the stock story of Lockean appropriation can easily explain the endorsement of a reversion, especially since his proposal specifies a term of years, not a life term. Locke's concerns about lack of access to individual works also do not fit the stock story, given that other works may be available or created." Shiffrin, supra note 9 at 155, fn. 48. It is true, however, that Locke's own March 1695 proposal was framed as a "term of years, not a life term," so Professor Shiffrin's point that that appears to be Locke's preferred mode of protection is valid. unreasonable to foreclose "a certain number of years after the death of the author, . . . as suppose, fifty or seventy years." as a legitimate reading of this passage. In other words, it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that Locke was expressly putting forward a life+50 or life+70 term on the table.
18
A careful reader might say that [a] in this passage Locke only indicates his willingness to have such property, not necessarily his support, and [b] "property" in the passage refers only to what the publisher holds, not what the author had originally. (Of course, either the publisher gets the property from the author OR whatever non-property rights the author has get converted to property when transferred to the publisher.) Both these points are clarified by Locke's March 18, 1695 suggested amendments of the minimimalist press regulation bill that Clarke had put forward in Parliament earlier that month.
19 Locke proposed three amendments. The first was that printers could not use an author's name without permission; the third concerned deposit of books in libraries.
20
For the second, Locke wrote the following: "To secure the author's property in his copy, or his to whom he has transferred it, I suppose such a clause as this [following] will do, subjoined to the clause above written: "And be it further enacted that no book, pamphlet, portraiture or paper printed with the name of the author or publisher upon it shall within [blank] years after its first edition be reprinted with or without the name of the author to it without authority given in writing by the author or somebody entitled by him . . . . ."
21
In short, Locke's simple proposal was that a wide variety of writings -perhaps including etchings -would, whenever first published with the name of the author, require the author's permission for any further reprinting. Assuming that the prudent author would withhold her work until she had struck a contractual deal for first publication, this was an elegant way to secure the right of reproduction to authors -and Locke proposed it "[t]o secure the author's property." Locke's choice of "secure[ing]" the "author's property" may intimate a preexisting right and Locke also makes a comment in the memorandum that may hint at some natural rights-based property interest being trampled by the then Licensing Act. In the beginning of the final paragraph of the memorandum, Locke says that the Licensing Act "was so manifest an invasion of the trade, liberty, and property of the subject, that it was made to be in force only for two years." [at 386] Locke clearly puts liberty and property interests in the publishing trade on a par -both being suppressed by and, therefore, pre-existing the Licensing Act. Whether Locke meant here "property" in a general or narrow sense is not clear, but the passage is intriguing nonetheless.
18
See also Astbury, supra note 4 at 309 (same interpretation). Locke was 60 years old when he wrote this memorandum -well past the average life expectancy of his time and just 11-12 years before his own death. He has just published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) and his Two Treatises of Government had been written in the 1680-1690 period. Given all this, one might speculate that Locke did not see any great difference between a term measured by publication and a term measured by the death of the author.
